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Abstract
We prove the equivalence of the semantic version of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth with a semantic
version of the Diagonal Lemma, and also show the equivalence of syntactic Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem with a weak
syntactic diagonal lemma. We outline three seemingly diagonal-free proofs for these theorems from the literature, and
show that syntactic Tarski’s theorem can deliver Go¨del-Rosser’s Incompleteness Theorem.
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1 Introduction
ONE OF THE CORNERSTONES of modern logic (and theory of incompleteness after Go¨del) is the Diagonal
Lemma (aka Self-Reference, or Fixed-Point Lemma) due to Go¨del and Carnap (see [11] and the references
therein). The lemma states that (when α 7→ pαq is a suitable Go¨del coding which assigns the closed term
pαq to a syntactic expression or object α) for a given formula Ψ(x) with the only free variable x, there exists
some sentence θ such that the equivalence Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ holds; “holding” could mean either being true in the
standard model of natural numbers N or being provable in a suitable theory T (which is usually taken to be
a consistent extension of Robinson’s arithmetic). When the equivalence Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ holds in N we call it
the Semantic Diagonal Lemma (studied in Section 2); when T proves the equivalence, we call it the Syntactic
Diagonal Lemma. TheWeak Diagonal Lemma states the consistency of the sentence Ψ(pθq)↔ θ with T , for
some sentence θ which depends on the given arbitrary formula Ψ(x) and the theory T (studied in Section 3).
The Diagonal Lemma has been used in proving many fundamental theorems of mathematical logic, such as
Go¨del’s First and (also) Second Incompleteness Theorems, Rosser’s (strengthening of Go¨del’s Incompleteness)
Theorem, and Tarski’s Theorem (on the Undefinability of Truth). One problem with the Diagonal Lemma is
its standard proof which is a kind of magic (or “pulling a rabbit out of the hat”, see e.g. [15]); indeed it is not
easy to remember its typical proof, even after several years of teaching it. Here, we quote some texts on the
proof of this lemma from the literature:
(1998) S. Buss writes in [1] that the proof of the Diagonal Lemma is “quite simple but rather tricky and
difficult to conceptualize.”
(2002) V. McGee states in [8] that by the diagonal (aka self-referential) lemma there exists a sentence φ for
a given formula Ψ(x) such that Ψ(pφq) ↔ φ is provable in Robinson’s arithmetic. “You would hope
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that such a deep theorem would have an insightful proof. No such luck. I am going to write down a
sentence φ and verify that it works. What I won’t do is give you a satisfactory explanation for why I
write down the particular formula I do. I write down the formula because Go¨del wrote down the formula,
and Go¨del wrote down the formula because, when he played the logic game he was able to see seven or
eight moves ahead, whereas you and I are only able to see one or two moves ahead. I don’t know anyone
who thinks he has a fully satisfying understanding of why the Self-referential Lemma works. It has a
rabbit-out-of-a-hat quality for everyone.”
(2004) H. Kotlarski [7] says that the diagonal lemma “being very intuitive in the natural language, is highly
unintuitive in formal theories like Peano arithmetic. In fact, the usual proof of the diagonal lemma [] is
short, but tricky and difficult to conceptualize. The problem was to eliminate this lemma from proofs of
Go¨dels result.
(2006) G. Sere´ny [13] attempts to make “the proof of the lemma completely transparent by showing that it is
simply a straightforward translation of the Grelling paradox into first-order arithmetic.”
(2006) H. Gaifman mentions in [3] that the proof of the Diagonal Lemma is “extremely short”. However, the
“brevity of the proof does not make for transparency; it has the aura of a magician’s trick.”
In this paper, we attempt at giving some explanations and motivations for this basic lemma, in a way that
we will have a satisfactory understanding for at least some weaker versions of it. For that purpose, we will first
see the equivalence of the semantic form of the diagonal lemma with Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability
of arithmetical truth (in Section 2). In other words, the diagonal lemma holds in the standard model of natural
numbers just because the set of (the Go¨del codes of) the true arithmetical sentences is not definable. As a
matter of fact, different proofs for Tarski’s undefinability theorem can lead to different proofs for the semantic
version of this lemma. We will review three such proofs (presented in [2, 4, 7, 6, 10, 12]) which are supposedly
diagonal-free. Having different proofs will, hopefully, shed some new light on the nature of this lemma and will
increase our understanding about it. Then, secondly, we will see that a syntactic version of Tarski’s theorem is
equivalent to a weak (syntactic) version of the diagonal lemma (in Section 3). This weak form of the diagonal
lemma is still sufficiently strong to prove Go¨del-Rosser’s incompleteness theorem. So, different proofs of the
syntactic version of Tarski’s theorem will provide some seemingly diagonal-free proofs for Rosser’s theorem
(cf. [14], where A. Visser derives Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem from Tarski’s undefinability theorem
by some circular-free arguments).
2 The Diagonal Lemma, Semantically
DEFINITION 2.1 (Semantic Diagonal Lemma):
The following statement is called the Semantic Diagonal Lemma:
For every formula Ψ(x) there exists a sentence θ such that N  Ψ(pθq)↔ θ. ✧
This (weaker) form of the Diagonal Lemma serves to prove the semantic version of Go¨del’s Incompleteness
Theorem:
THEOREM 2.2 (Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem for Sound Definable Theories):
For every definable and sound theory T there exists a true sentence independent from T .
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PROOF:
If T is definable then there exists a formula PrT (x) such that for every sentence η we have T ⊢ η if and only
if N  PrT (pηq). Now, by the Semantic Diagonal Lemma we have N  γ ↔ ¬PrT (pγq) for some sentence γ.
It can be seen that T 0 γ, since T ⊢ γ implies on the one hand that N  PrT (pγq), and on the other hand (by
the soundness of T ) that N  γ and so N  ¬PrT (pγq), a contradiction. So, T 0 γ, therefore N  ¬PrT (pγq),
whence N  γ, which also implies (by the soundness of T ) that T 0 ¬γ. QED|
Also, Tarski’s Theorem on the Undefinability of (arithmetical) Truth follows from the Semantic Diagonal
Lemma:
THEOREM 2.3 (Tarski’s Theorem on the Undefinability of Arithmetical Truth):
The Go¨del codes of the set of true sentences, i.e., {pηq | N  η}, is not definable in N.
PROOF:
If {pηq | N  η} is definable by some Γ(x), then N  Γ(pθq)↔ θ holds for every sentence θ. Now, by the
Semantic Diagonal Lemma N  ¬Γ(pλq)↔ λ holds for a sentence λ; so we have N  λ↔ Γ(pλq)↔¬λ,
which is a contradiction. QED|
The fact of the matter is that the Semantic Diagonal Lemma is equivalent to Tarski’s Theorem on the
Undefinability of Truth:
THEOREM 2.4 (Semantic Diagonal Lemma ⇐⇒ Tarski’s Theorem):
The Semantic Diagonal Lemma is equivalent to Tarski’s Theorem on the Undefinability of Truth in arithmetic.
PROOF:
That the Semantic Diagonal Lemma implies Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem was proved in Theorem 2.3.
We now prove that Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem implies the Semantic Diagonal Lemma. Suppose that
the set {pθq | N  θ} is not definable by any formula. Then for a given formula Ψ(x) the formula ¬Ψ(x)
cannot define this set, and so we cannot have N  ¬Ψ(pβq) ⇐⇒ N  β, for all sentences β; whence there
should exists some sentence θ such that N 2 ¬Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ. Now, by the classical propositional tautology
¬(p ↔ q) ≡ (¬p ↔ q), we have N  Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ. So, for every Ψ(x) there exists some θ for which the
equivalence Ψ(pθq)↔ θ holds in N. QED|
So, after all, Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem (in its semantic form) is not very much different from the
Diagonal Lemma (in the semantic form). Therefore, it may seem at the first glance that the only way to prove
Tarski’s theorem is to use the Diagonal Lemma (as is done in almost all the textbooks). But as a matter of fact,
there are some, supposedly, diagonal-free proofs for Tarski’s theorem in the literature (see e.g. [4]) which by
Theorem 2.4 can give us some diagonal-free proofs for the Diagonal Lemma itself! We will outline three of
them below:
Assume that Γ(x) defines truth in N; i.e.,
(T) N  Γ(pβq)↔ β for all sentences β.
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2.1 Proof One
CONVENTION: Let us make the convention that all the individual variables of our syntax are x, x′, x′′, x′′′, · · ·
whose lengths are 1, 2, 3, 4, · · · , respectively. By this convention, there will be at most finitely many formulas
with length n for a given n∈N (otherwise the formulas x=x, y=y, z=z, · · · all would have length three).
DEFINITION 2.5 (len(x), n, definability, D(x), Def<z
Γ
(y), Berry<v
Γ
(u), ℓΓ, BΓ(x)):
• Let len(x) denote the length of the formula with Go¨del code x.
• For n∈N, let n be the term that represents the number n, i.e., 0 = 0, 1 = 1, and for every m> 1 we
havem+ 1 = 1 + (m).
• We say that a number n∈N is definable by the formula ϕ(x), in which x is the only free variable, when
∀ζ [ϕ(ζ)↔ ζ=n] is true (in N).
• Let D(x, y) be the formula which states that the formula with Go¨del code x defines the number y; so,
D(pϕq, y) = ∀ζ [ϕ(ζ)↔ ζ=y].
• Let Def<z
Γ
(y) be the formula ∃α
[
Formula(α) ∧ len(α)< z ∧ Γ(pD(α, y)q)
]
which states that the
number y is definable by a formula with length less than z; needless to say, Formula(α) states that α is
the Go¨del code of a formula.
• Let Berry<v
Γ
(u) be the formula ¬Def<v
Γ
(u) ∧ ∀w<u Def<v
Γ
(w), which states that u is the least number
not defined by a formula with length less than v.
• Let ℓΓ be the length of the formula Berry
<x′
Γ
(x).
• Let BΓ(x) be the formula ∃x
′
[
x′=6 · ℓΓ ∧ Berry
<x′
Γ
(x)
]
. ✧
Here is an alternative proof (from [2, 7, 12]) for contradicting (T):
PROOF:
The length of BΓ(x) is less than 6ℓΓ; since it can be seen to be equal to 10+len(5)+len(ℓΓ)+ℓΓ=24+5ℓΓ,
as we have len(m)=4m−3 for every m>1. So, the formula BΓ(x) with length less than 6ℓΓ states that x is
the least number that is not definable by any formula with length less than 6ℓΓ. Whence, if BΓ(x) holds, then
x should not be definable by BΓ(x) itself. But this is a contradiction, since if BΓ(x) holds, then x is definable
by BΓ(ζ). That is because BΓ(x) implies ∀ζ [BΓ(ζ) ↔ ζ = x] by the sentence ∀u, v[BΓ(u) ∧ BΓ(v) → u= v],
which follows in turn from the sentence ∀u, v, w[Berry<w
Γ
(u)∧Berry<w
Γ
(v)→ u=v] that can be proved from
the basic laws of the order relation. So, for no x can BΓ(x) hold. Now, in reality, there exists a number b∈N
that is not definable by any formula of length less than 6ℓΓ (since by our convention there are only finitely
many formulas with length less than 6ℓΓ). So, ¬Def
<6·ℓΓ
Γ
(b) is true, and since it is the least such number then
∀w<b Def<6·ℓ
Γ
(w) is true too. Thus, Berry<6·ℓΓ
Γ
(b) is true; and so is BΓ(b), which is a contradiction. QED|
This proof of Tarski’s theorem (2.3) does not use the Diagonal Lemma (and so it can be called diagonal-free
in a way), though it can be debated whether the proof is genuinely circular-free or not. By incorporating the
proof of Theorem 2.4 into this proof (e.g. by taking Γ ≡ ¬Ψ), one can get a proof for the Semantic Diagonal
Lemma, which is different from the standard (textbook) proofs (see [11]).
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2.2 Proof Two
DEFINITION 2.6 (Definable and Dominating Functions):
A function f: N→ N is called definable whenever there exists a formula ϕ(u, v) such that for everym,n∈N
we have f(m)=n ⇐⇒ N  ϕ(m,n).
A function F : N → N is said to dominate a function f : N → N, whenever there exists some n∈N such that
F (x)>f(x) holds for all x>n. ✧
Indeed, for a given countably indexed family of functions {fi : N → N}i∈N one can find a function that
dominates all the functions of this family: put
F (x)=1+maxi6x fi(x);
then for every k ∈N and every x> k, fk(x)6maxi6x fi(x)< [1+maxi6x fi(x)] = F (x) holds. This idea is
used in the following proof of Tarski’s theorem (2.3); cf. [6, 7]:
PROOF:
Define the function F: N→ N as
F (x) = min{y | ∀α6x[∃z α(x, z)→∃z<y α(x, z)]}.
We show that the function F dominates every definable function, but is itself definable if (T) holds; and
this is a contradiction (since no function can dominate itself). To see that F dominates the family of all
definable functions, assume that a function f : N → N is definable by a formula ϕ(u, v). Now, for every
m > pϕq we show that F (m) > f(m) holds: if F (m) 6 f(m), then from ϕ(m, f(m)) we have ∃zϕ(m, v)
and so ∃z < F (m): ϕ(m, z) by the definition of F , which implies ∃z < f(m): ϕ(m, z) by the assumption
F (m) 6 f(m); but for every k 6= f(m) we have ¬ϕ(m, k), and so ∀z < f(m): ¬ϕ(m, z), a contradiction.
Now, if (T) holds for Γ, then F is actually definable by ψ(u, v)∧∀w<v¬ψ(u, w)where ψ(u, v) is the formula
∀α6u[∃z Γ(pα(u, z)q)→ ∃z<v Γ(pα(u, z)q)]. QED|
As a matter of fact, the function F used by Kotlarski [6, 7] is defined as
F (x) = min{y | ∀α,u6x[∃z α(u, z)→∃z<y α(u, z)]}
which corresponds to F (x)=1+maxi,j6x fi(j) that dominates {fi: N→N}i∈N.
2.3 Proof Three
The last proof that we present is a simplified version of Robinson’s proof [10] (cf. [4, 7]). For a definition of
Skolem term see e.g. [5].
PROOF:
Let M be a non-standard model of true arithmetic Th(N); actually it suffices for M to be a model of Peano’s
arithmetic. Put M′ = {ti(a) | ti is an M–Skolem term, i∈N} for a fixed non-standard a∈M. Then M′ 4 M
holds, and for every n ∈ N we have M′ |= ∃x
∧
i<n[x 6= ti(a)]. So, if (T) holds for Γ, then we have
M′ |= ∃x ∀y<n Γ(px 6= ty(a)q) for all n∈N which by overspill (see [5]) implies that for some non-standard
b∈M′ we haveM′ |= ∃x ∀y<b Γ(px 6= ty(a)q). Thus, for some c∈M
′ we should haveM′ |= [c 6= ti(a)] for
all i∈N; a contradiction. QED|
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3 The Diagonal Lemma, Syntactically
The Diagonal Lemma is usually stated as the provability of the equivalence Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ in a theory like
Robinson’s arithmetic, for some sentence θ which depends on the given formula Ψ(x). Let us call this the
Syntactic Diagonal Lemma. A syntactic version of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth is as follows:
DEFINITION 3.1 (Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem):
For a formula Ψ(x), let TBΨ be the set of all truth biconditionals Ψ(pβq) ↔ β, where β ranges over all the
sentences. That is TBΨ = {Ψ(pβq)↔ β | β is a sentence}.
The following statement is called the Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem on a consistent T :
For every Ψ(x) we have T + TBΨ. ✧
REMARK 3.2 (Proof Three for Syntactic Tarskis Theorem):
We can see that the Proof Three (presented in Subsection 2.3) can deliver the Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem for
any theory T that extends Peano’s arithmetic: if T ⊇ TBΓ then put T in the place of Th(N) in that proof;
recall that overspill holds for (all the models of) Peano’s arithmetic [5]. ✧
Now that we have a diagonal-free proof for Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem, let us note that it is equivalent to
a weak (syntactic) diagonal lemma.
DEFINITION 3.3 (Weak Diagonal Lemma):
The following statement is called theWeak Diagonal Lemma about a consistent theory T :
For every Ψ(x) there exists a sentence θ such that Ψ(pθq)↔θ is consistent with T . ✧
THEOREM 3.4 (Weak Diagonal Lemma ⇐⇒ Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem):
The Weak Diagonal Lemma is equivalent to Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem.
PROOF:
First, suppose that the Weak Diagonal Lemma holds for a consistent theory T . Take any formula Ψ(x); we
show that T + TBΨ. There exists a sentence θ such that the theory T is consistent with ¬Ψ(pθq)↔ θ. Thus,
T 0 Ψ(pθq)↔ θ and so T 0 TBΨ.
Second, suppose that T + TBΦ for all formulas Φ(x). Take any formula Ψ(x); we show the existence of
some θ such that T is consistent with Ψ(pθq)↔ θ. Since T + TB¬Ψ, there should exist some sentence θ such
that T 0 ¬Ψ(pθq)↔ θ. Therefore, T is consistent with the sentence Ψ(pθq)↔θ. QED|
As a matter of fact, the Weak Diagonal Lemma cannot show the independence of the Go¨del sentence (when
the theory is sound even):
REMARK 3.5 (Weak Diagonal Lemma vs. Go¨del’s Proof):
For a consistent and recursively enumerable theory T extending Robinson’s arithmetic, the consistency of
¬PrT (pθq) ↔ θ with T implies that θ is unprovable in T , but does not imply that θ is independent from T ,
even if T is ω-consistent:
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(1) If T ⊢ θ then T ⊢ PrT (pθq), and so T +[¬PrT (pθq)↔ θ] ⊢ ¬θ, therefore T +[¬PrT (pθq)↔ θ] cannot
be consistent.
(2) For a contradictory sentence like δ = (0 6= 0), the sentence ¬PrT (pδq) ↔ δ is consistent with T (by
Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem), but δ is not independent from T (as T proves its negation).
It is stated in [9, p. 202] that for every sentence σ, T ⊢ σ ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ¬PrT (pσq) implies T 0 ¬σ if T is
sound. Unfortunately, this is not true since for e.g. σ = (0 6=0) we do have that T ⊢ σ ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ¬PrT (pσq)
by Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem, but trivially T ⊢ ¬σ holds. If we replace PrT (x) with Rosser’s
provability predicate RPrT (x), then it is true that for every ̺ that satisfies T ⊢ ̺ ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ¬RPrT (p̺q) we
have T 0 ̺,¬̺ if T is (only) consistent; see the next theorem. ✧
However, the Weak Diagonal Lemma is sufficiently strong to prove Rosser’s theorem:
THEOREM 3.6 (Weak Diagonal Lemma =⇒ Rosser’s Theorem):
If the Weak Diagonal Lemma holds for a consistent and recursively enumerable theory that extends Robinson’s
arithmetic, then there exists a sentences which is independent from that theory.
PROOF:
For such a theory T , suppose that prfT (x, y) is its proof predicate (stating that x is the Go¨del code of a proof
of the sentence with Go¨del code y in T ). By the Weak Diagonal Lemma there exists a sentence ρ such that the
following theory is consistent:
U = T +
(
∀x
[
prfT (x, pρq)→ ∃y<x prfT (y, p¬ρq)
]
←→ ρ
)
.
The standard proof of Rosser’s theorem can show that ρ is independent from T :
• If T ⊢ ρ, then T ⊢ prfT (k, pρq) for some k∈N and so U ⊢ ∃y<k prfT (y, p¬ρq), by the definition of U ,
which contradicts
∧
m∈N U ⊢ ¬prfT (m, p¬ρq) (that holds by T 0 ¬ρ).
• If T ⊢ ¬ρ, then T ⊢ prfT (k, p¬ρq) for some k∈N. Reason inside U :
for some x we have prfT (x, pρq) ∧ ∀y<x¬prfT (y, p¬ρq); now k<x is impossible, and so x6k,
whence
∨
i6k (x = i), therefore
∨
i6k prfT (i, pρq).
Hence, U ⊢
∨
i6k prfT (i, pρq), but this contradicts
∧
m∈N U ⊢ ¬prfT (m, pρq) (that holds by T 0 ρ).
Therefore, T 0 ρ,¬ρ. QED|
So, the Weak Diagonal Lemma is worthy of studying further. Unfortunately, Proof Two (Subsection 2.2)
for Tarski’s Theorem cannot be carried over to the Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem (cf. [14]). However, Proof One
(Subsection 2.1) can be adapted for it:
THEOREM 3.7 (Syntactic Tarski’s Theorem):
If T is a consistent extension of Robinson’s arithmetic, then for no formula Ψ(x) can we have T ⊇ TBΨ.
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PROOF:
Assume that the consistent theory T contains Robinson’s arithmetic and the set TBΓ, for a formula Γ(x). We
work with the Convention of Subsection 2.1 (and also Definition 2.5). Let q be the term 6 · ℓΓ which represents
the number 6ℓΓ. Fix a number n∈N; and reason inside the theory T :
Assume BΓ(n); so, Berry
<q
Γ
(n) thus (1) ¬Def<q
Γ
(n) and (2) ∀w<n Def<q
Γ
(w) hold. Fix ζ ; if BΓ(ζ) holds,
then (i) ¬Def<q
Γ
(ζ) and (ii) ∀w<ζ Def<q
Γ
(w). We also have either ζ <n or ζ=n or ζ >n (which holds
in Robinson’s arithmetic). Now, ζ <n contradicts (i) and (2), and ζ >n contradicts (1) and (ii). Whence,
ζ = n; which shows that ∀ζ [BΓ(ζ) ↔ ζ = n] holds. Thus, D(pBΓq, n) holds and since len(BΓ(x))< q,
then we have Def
<q
Γ
(n) by TBΓ; which contradicts (1). Therefore, the assumption BΓ(n) leads to a
contradiction. Whence, ¬BΓ(n) holds, so ¬Berry
<q
Γ
(n), thus we have (∗)
∧
i<n Def
<q
Γ
(i)→ Def<q
Γ
(n).
Therefore, T ⊢ Def<q
Γ
(n) can be shown by induction on n ∈ N from (∗). Let p ∈ N be greater than all the
Go¨del codes of formulas with length less than 6ℓΓ. Therefore, for all n∈N we have T ⊢ ∃α<pΓ(pD(α, n)q).
So, inside T for any n ∈ N there exists some formula αn(x) that defines n, i.e., ∀ζ [αn(ζ) ↔ ζ = n] holds,
and the Go¨del codes of all αn’s are less than p. This contradicts the Pigeonhole’s Principle a version of which
is provable in Robinson’s arithmetic: since both of the sentences ∀x(x ≮ 0) and ∀x(x< k+1 → x6 k) are
provable in this arithmetic, then for every {αk < p}k6p there should exist some i < j 6 p such that αi = αj .
Reason inside T again:
There are some i<j6p and some formula ϕ(x) for which we have Γ(pD(pϕq, i)q) and Γ(pD(pϕq, j)q).
So, by TBΓ, both ∀ζ [ϕ(ζ) ↔ ζ = i] and ∀ζ [ϕ(ζ) ↔ ζ = j] hold, combining which implies that
i= i→ ϕ(i)→ i=j, a contradiction.
So, T is inconsistent, which is a contradiction with the assumption. QED|
4 Conclusion
The semantic form of Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem, that the set {pηq | N  η} is not definable in arithmetic,
is equivalent to the semantic form of the Diagonal Lemma, that for a givenΨ(x) there exists a sentence θ such
that N  Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ. We outlined three seemingly diagonal-free proofs for these equivalent theorems. The
syntactic form of Tarski’s Theorem, that no consistent extension of Robinson’s arithmetic contains the set of
truth biconditionals TBΨ = {Ψ(pβq) ↔ β | β is a sentence}, is equivalent to the Weak (syntactic) Diagonal
Lemma, that for every Ψ(x) there exists a sentence θ such that Ψ(pθq) ↔ θ is consistent with such a theory.
Even though Go¨del’s proof does not work with the Weak Diagonal Lemma, the weak lemma is sufficiently
strong to prove Rosser’s theorem. So, the syntactic form of Tarski’s theorem can derive Rosser’s theorem (by
combining Theorems 3.4 and 3.6; cf. [14]) and the proof of Theorem 3.7 and Remark 3.2 provide diagonal-free
proofs for Go¨del-Rosser’s Theorem.
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